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BSTRACT
 
The development of modern science has depended strongly on specific features of the cultures
involved; however, its results are widely and transculturally accepted and applied. The science
and technology of electricity, for example, emerged as a specific product of post-Renaissance
Europe, rooted in the Greek philosophical tradition that encourages explanations of nature in
theoretical terms. It did not evolve in China presumably because such encouragement was miss-
ing. The transcultural acceptance of modern science and technology is postulated to be due, in
part, to the common biological dispositions underlying human cognition, with generalizable ca-
pabilities of abstract, symbolic and strategic thought. These faculties of the human mind are
main prerequisites for dynamic cultural development and differentiation.  They appear to have
evolved up to a stage of hunters and gatherers perhaps some 100 000 years ago. However, the
extent of the correspondence between some constructions of the human mind and the order of
nature, as revealed by science, is a late insight of the last two centuries. Unless we subscribe to
extreme forms of constructivism or historical relativism, we may take the success and the for-
mal structure of science as indications of a close, intrinsic relation between the physical and the
mental, between the order of nature and the structure of human cognition. At the metatheoreti-
cal level, however, modern science is consistent with philosophical and cultural diversity.
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A few years ago, there was a remarkable exhibition in Berlin on the history of Chinese technol-
ogy. I was impressed by the sophistication of mechanical designs and chemical processes on
display, most of them more advanced than those seen in Europe before the Renaissance. The
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invention of gunpowder was said to have originated from the combination of coloured sub-
stances representing metaphysical features that in conjunction should have given rise to some
ideal property. A particular combination exploded. Eventually,  explosive mixtures were uti-
lized for various military as well as non-military purposes. 
Tradition and development of technology benefited from practical skills as well as from the
mental structuring of knowlegde in China, as it did in Europe. And yet, there were impressive
qualitative differences between the highly elaborated tradition of the Chinese and the evolving
modern European technology, the most  conspicuous being that electricity was virtually absent
in Chinese technology, despite its very advanced level in other fields. Was it just because some
contingent initiation was effective in Europe that did not occur in China? The answer seems to
be “no”. Around 1750, there were contacts between members of the Russian Academy in St.
Petersburg, involved in research on electricity, and Jesuits in China who were engaged in sci-
ence and technology; instruments were transferred to Peking and some studies on electricity
were made there. However, the Jesuits found it difficult to motivate Chinese intellectuals to get
acquainted with the theoretical background of electricity. Without such acquaintance, experi-
mental demonstrations of electrical phenomena were considered dangerous. It appears that the
Chinese interest in the field either could not be raised, or soon faded away, in contrast to the
subsequent dramatic developments in Europe. The dynamic scientific and technological devel-
opments in post-Renaissance Europe as compared to China may be attributed to different caus-
es depending on the field, but when it comes to electricity the European pursuit of theoretical
knowledge based on general physical laws was most likely a decisive factor. 
This, I would claim, is at least partially due to the nature of electricity itself: Electric forces are
extremely strong, being mainly responsible for the coherence and properties of matter. It is for
this very reason that most objects are neutral and electric phenomena, such as lightning or fric-
tional electricity, are rare and marginal in common experience. Therefore, exploration requires
basic research driven by theoretical curiosity, and it is this feature that has a specific tradition
linked to European culture. 2500 years ago, the pre-Socratic philosophers pursued the rational
explanation of nature in abstract theoretical terms. With the rise of monotheistic religions of
revelation in the first Millenium, these efforts were discouraged as contributing nothing to sal-
vation; however, in the Middle Ages a positive attitude gradually developed towards scientific
thought, especially at the newly founded universities, implicating that a rational understanding
of nature by the human mind is in accordance with the will of God. In fact, the ‘book of nature’
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was claimed by some to have almost equal status with the Holy Scriptures. In the Renaissance
period, the creative power of the individual mind was emphasized and, in modern times, start-
ing with Galilei, Kepler and Newton, the foundations of modern science were laid: just a few
general laws of physics were claimed to underlie all events in space and time. In designing the
theory of gravitation Newton incorporated celestial mechanics into the set of general physical
laws; later, electricity and radiation, the foundations of chemistry and eventually molecular bi-
ology were integrated into a framework of a generalized Newtonian type of physics, a physics
based on a few forces and a few elegant and formally simple mathematical relations.  
The motives for the developments of modern science were mixed, as demonstrated by the stat-
utes and practices of the Academies that were main centres of scientific research in the 17th and
18th century. On the one hand, experiments and the acquisition of knowledge were expected to
improve technology and economics; however, another main motivation was the prospect of
achieving a basic understanding of nature in rational terms by discovering general laws of na-
ture, making it possible to explain specific physical structures, phenomena and processes. Elec-
tricity is a particularly impressive example. Though magnets as well as electrostatic effects
were known to both ancient Chinese and Greeks, it was only in 18th century Europe that elec-
tricity began to receive a great deal of systematic scientific attention. Thorough measurements
and analysis led Coulomb, around 1785, to the conclusion that the forces between electric
charges follow basically the same type of mathematically simple laws as the forces of gravita-
tion. Chemoelectric effects were found and investigated, allowing from 1800 onwards for the
substitution of clumsy machines generating electricity by friction, by batteries making electric-
ity readily available for experimenters. In 1820, Oersted discovered that magnetism was gener-
ated by electric currents. In 1831, Faraday reported that electricity was generated by the relative
movement of a conductor and a magnet. On the basis of these fundamental results, it was real-
ized that in principle it was possible to build electromagnetic generators of electric currents, and
that these currents could be distributed to be used by electromagnetic machines for all types of
mechanical work, as well as for other purposes. 
Nevertheless, it was half a century before this technology became widely applied. In a first
phase, electric technology was confined to such niches as galvanization, electric light by the
arch lamp, and, in particular, telegraphy. It is striking that the pioneers of electrical engineering,
Edison and Siemens, gained their initial experience in the improvement of telegraphic commu-
nication. Around 1867, the dynamo was invented, in which electric currents themselves pro-
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duce the magnetic field that is required for the generation of electricity. After the incandescent
electric lamp had been developed for general use and application, in 1882, the first power plant
was established in New York. Such large-scale electric networks for wide distribution of elec-
tricity constituted the breakthrough in the use of electric power for multiple purposes, ranging
from the generation of light to electric traction.
A somewhat analogous story of immense though retarded technological consequences of theo-
retical physical insights can be told about electromagnetic waves. Around 1864, the theoretical
physicist Maxwell proposed a set of formally beautiful, comprehensive equations for electro-
magnetic phenomena in terms of electric and magnetic fields. Problems of internal consistency
were resolved by the inclusion of a new, particularly important term into the equations. It says,
in words, that not only do changing magnetic fields produce electricity; changing electric fields
also produce magnetism. This term is of little consequence in conventional electromechanics,
because effects would be negligibly small in mechanical devices, but it is of great interest with
respect to other phenomena. In particular, the equations suggested the existence of electromag-
netic waves of high frequency. In 1888, Hertz experimentally discovered such electromagnetic
waves, in full accord with Maxwell’s theory. It turned out that natural light was essentially just
such an electromagnetic wave and that artificial waves with many different properties could be
produced, which later formed the basis of modern means of communication, including radio
and television. 
Among the more recent technological developments let me select information processing in
computers. Microelectronics also developed following scientific insights - in this case, into sol-
id state physics -, though this was a rather specialized field of science not directly linked to the
deepest questions about the physical explanation of nature. Layers of silicium with added small
amounts of different atoms were produced and arranged in such a way as to allow for fast elec-
tric processing of large amounts of information on a microscale with high efficiency. Similarly,
information processing in neural networks is also based on charge separations across small dis-
tances, namely membranes of nerve cells, in this case controlled by voltage- as well as ligand-
gated channels. Fast  modes of processing of electric signals on a microscale are capable of
combining efficiency and reliability of information processing, be it in computers or in brains.
In both cases, this process depends on highly specific material properties, which are the result
of hundreds of millions of years of evolution in the case of neural networks, and very sophisti-
cated technological development in the case of microelectronics. It is by no means obvious
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from the basic laws of physics that such highly efficient modes of processing information can
be materialized at all; this is an insight of the 20th century only, resulting from neural biology,
solid state physics and information theory. 
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Throughout the development of physics there were close interrelations between science and
technology; this is particularly evident in instrumentation. After the physical principles allow-
ing for a new technology were discovered, this was followed by technological development for
implementation. However, it would be misleading to subsume this process altogether under ‘ap-
plied science’. The basic laws of physics can be taken as algorithms for calculating changes,
and thus the behaviour of given material entities, in the course of time; however, they do not
permit, by themselves, determining every possible stable or stationary state of material systems
and their properties, that is, everything that exists or can be made to exist technologically. Thus,
not only science, but science-based technology as well requires, for epistomological reasons,
creativity, intuition drawn from various fields, and often luck. The styles of science and tech-
nology differ because the areas and contexts in which creativity and invention is necessary are
different. In particular, implementation of techniques often requires that adequate materials be
found - say, for filaments of the electric light bulb - as well as geometric arrangements of de-
vices, such as the moving and non-moving components of electric dynamos and engines. Last
but not least, the solution must be economically feasible. There is no algorithm for such tech-
nological design and innovation in the first place - neither for the choice of suitable material
compositions, nor of efficient spatial arrangements of components - starting from the basic laws
of physics. 
Technological developments are often strongly influenced by political and psychological fac-
tors as well. Electricity is a good choice of topic, but we could just as well have taken organic
chemistry or molecular biology. The history of electric technology provides abundant material
for studying the conditions underlying the conversion of theoretical knowledge into practical
application. There are specific reasons for the success of some countries (United States and Ger-
many in the case of electricity) relative to others (especially England, presumably because, and
not although, England was already by far the most developed country industrially in the 19th
century). As for obstacles to implementation, the story of electric traction in Germany is an in-
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teresting case: the electric street car was invented and first introduced in Berlin around 1880,
and yet it took half a century to implement electric traction in the major urban and suburban
transport system of this city at large (the “S-Bahn”), partially because of a powerful resistance
of the steam engine lobby. 
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The historical remarks on the science and technology of electricity were meant to show some
features of the relation between basic science and technological innovation: at first, intellectual
curiosity is a main motive - the desire to achieve understanding of strange artificial phenomena
and to eventually integrate it into the framework of general physical laws. Some of the results
then suggest practical applications, but considerable technical development is required for its
realization. These features applied to electromagnetic machines and, at a later stage, to electro-
magnetic waves. Practical implementations of other fields of science, including molecular bi-
ology have been more diverse, but show the same general pattern. 
The pre-requisites of modern science and the corresponding technological developments ap-
pear to have been rather specific features of modern European culture, to be traced back to a
specific sequence of intra- and cross-cultural developments in the course of history ranging
from ancient Greek and Hebrew ideas through Christian and Islamic cultural traditions. No mat-
ter how impressive achievements of other lines of cultural tradition (such as those in East Asia),
have been in mechanics, instrumentation, chemistry and manufacture, there have also been de-
velopments (such as that of electrodynamics), that are linked specifically, though partially in-
directly, to post-Renaissance European culture with its emphasis on basic science directed
towards a comprehensive understanding of natural processes in theoretical, and often mathe-
matical terms. Nowadays, electricity is applied worldwide, and the corresponding physics is
also taught and understood worldwide. Cultural specificity of origins and transcultural accep-
tance of results are characteristics of modern science. Let us now consider the possible reasons
for these two characteristics. 
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As a starting point, it may be appropriate to draw attention to some of the biological dispositions
underlying human cognition. There is genetic evidence suggesting that the current world pop-
ulation may have originated from a small group in Africa that lived some 200 000 to 100 000
years ago; this is not altogether certain, but it looks that way. We do not know whether there
was a concomitant upgrading of cognitive capabilities  that allowed descendants of this group
to replace other branches of 
 
Homo
 
 throughout the world, but I would guess there was. Anyhow,
it was the modern species of man that developed art, such as cave paintings more than 30 000
years ago, and that ever since has been developing new cultural features documented by im-
proved tools, by the innovation of agriculture, and, eventually, by the emergence of ‘high’ cul-
tures marking the transition from prehistory into history. 
Chimpanzees show rudiments of culture in that they acquire and transfer habits and skills. Early
men developed culture with increasing complexity of artifacts until they were substituted by bi-
ologically superior humans. At some stages, cultural and genetic changes probably co-evolved.
Then, following the advent of biologically modern man, cultural dynamics as such appears as
the main factor of further change and development. Cultures, as we know them, are products of
dynamic development and differentiation, based predominantly on the relatively fast transfer of
information by means of language, rather than on comparatively slow effects of mutation and
selection of genes of their human carriers. 
Whereas dynamic cultural development itself is not a genetic process, it depends critically on
general capabilities, which are, in turn, biological features of the species of modern man and,
thus, products of biological evolution. In other words, the capability for culture is encoded in
our genes, the individual culture itself is not. An example is the human language faculty: Chim-
panzees are able to learn some hundred symbols, but only humans can learn languages at a level
encompassing a virtually unlimited manifold of expressions, abstract terms, tenses for past and
future, and grammaticalization. Virtually everybody can learn any language. Artificial con-
structs of communication by sounds do not usually work as natural languages do, and once a
given language is learned it is difficult to learn a second one up to the perfection of native speak-
ers. One may infer that the human language faculty is encoded in very abstract terms in our
genes as a necessary, though of course not sufficient, condition for the acquisition of language,
but the language itself is a product of culture. As an educated guess we might extrapolate these
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notions on linguistics to the biological basis of human cognitive capabilities in general: they are
most probably basically similar in all human societies, to a first approximation. And, therefore,
the widespread acceptance of modern science as the relatively most adequate way of explaining
nature, I would suggest, is rooted in the common biological features of the human brain
throughout mankind that are the evolutionary basis of human cognitive capabilities. At least in
principle and in the long run, they allow for reception and comparative assessment of informa-
tion regardless of its origin. 
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The capabilities of human cognition, which are shared by all mankind, are undoubtedly limited,
and it is remarkable to what extent scientific thought itself has revealed its own limitations: It
is a law of quantum physics  that quantum physics does not allow the accurate prediction of fu-
ture events in atomic and molecular dimensions. However, it is also a law of quantum physics
that the energy state of a stable system can be determined and calculated with unbelievable ac-
curacy. So, to a considerable extent, we know what we know and we know what we don’t know.
It is a law of mathematics that rich formal systems do not allow the proof of their consistency
by their own means. It is at least a fair guess that complete scientific understanding of the mind-
brain relation may not be possible in principle. All these limitations are related to self-referen-
tial features of analysis: limits of measuring the state of measuring instruments in the case of
quantum physics; limits of a logic of logical systems in the case of mathematical undecidability;
limits of mental, and thus conscious analysis of consciousness in our attempts to resolve the re-
lations between the mental and the physical. These limitations, in turn, are related to the fact
that 
 
any
 
 analysis is from 
 
within
 
 a system of which we, the analysers, are parts rather than de-
tached entities. 
At the metatheoretical level, such limitations allow for different philosophical interpretations.
One may consider physics, as I prefer to, as a theory of possible knowledge of nature rather than
of nature itself - this is the interpretation of Bohr and Heisenberg of quantum indeterminacy -
or one may assume, alternatively, that there are still real processes not accessible to us that un-
derlie observations which are subject to uncertainty relations. One may interpret the Goedel
type laws of mathematical undecidability as an indication that any formal human thought de-
pends on intuitive presuppositions (an interpretation I definitely prefer) or one may regard
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them, as some of the professional mathematicians do, just as formal laws applying to formal
laws. And one may think of limits of decodability of the mind-brain relation - assuming that
they exist - as implying that subjective conscious experience may exceed what is accessible to
outward physical analysis of the brain in principle (an interpretation I strongly advocate), or one
may still consider mental states as 
 
nothing
 
 
 
but
 
 epiphenomena of physical processes in the neural
network even if we don’t understand this relationship. These different interpretations, in turn,
are related to age-old controversies on the relation of human thought to reality, extending back
to the roots of Ancient Greek philosophy. It seems to me that the persistence of these contro-
versies, not only over decades but over more than two thousand years, is 
 
not
 
 due to the failure
of the intelligent to convince the less intelligent philosophers;  rather it indicates that the world
we experience is intrinsically and unavoidably ambiguous with respect to interpretations at the
metatheoretical level and will always be so. Different concepts and ideas at this level are com-
patible with established facts and formal logic rendering modern science as a whole consistent
with different, though of course not all, philosophical, cultural and religious interpretations of
man and the universe. We realize that there are open questions in these contexts that are expect-
ed to remain open even if the “Super-String-Theory of Everything” (TOE) would eventually
succeed to everybody’s satisfaction - questions as to why there is something and not nothing;
why we can understand, in theoretical terms, so much of the order of the universe in which we
are, physically, an almost negligible entity; and how the conditions for the material realization
of life, mind and conciousness are linked to the physical order of nature. 
This openess at the metatheoretical level is in contrast to what many people used to think, par-
ticularly in the 19th century: namely that a uniform scientific world culture would eventually
replace diversified less rational metaphysical and religious notions. The choice of the interpre-
tation one prefers, of course, is not ambiguous; nobody would just cast dice on what he or she
would most easily accept or believe. It is a matter of temperament, socialization, and art de
vivre, and it requires wisdom, not just knowledge. Agnostic and religious world views are ex-
pected to co-exist in the long run. It appears that liberal versions of both are consistent with sci-
entific thought, in contrast to narrow fundamentalistic and ideological notions. Moreover, many
cultures seem to be endowed with a considerable bandwidth of tolerance towards intrinsic in-
consistencies. As a whole, historically different cultures proved remarkably efficient and rather
robust in absorbing scientific and technological knowledge by intercultural communication,
without loosing their identity distinguishing them from others. 
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Recognizing that human cognition has limits, we may nevertheless ask why it extends as far as
has been revealed by the history of modern science. How could evolution lead to cognitive ca-
pabilities of human brains, making them capable of such abstract theoretical constructs and
mathematical deductions as are required, for instance, to design and understand formally beau-
tiful physical laws, such as Maxwell’s equations of electrodynamics? Clearly, there was no ob-
vious selective advantage for such sophisticated capabilities when the features of the human
brain evolved biologically up to the stage of hunters and gatherers. The direct selective advan-
tage for such skills, however,  was not necessary according to evolutionary theory. What was
essential was the evolution of – presumably  few but fairly general – basic capabilities of the
human brain allowing the introduction or upgrading of symbolic thought and meta-levels of ab-
straction. These features could have been advantageous for social life, technical performance
and rituals even at the stage of hunters and gatherers, as suggested, for instance, by abstract
symbols in cave paintings some thirtythousand years old. Most likely, these cognitive faculties
included mental preconditions for the abstraction ‘number’ and set the stage for the human
mind to arrive at, teach and elaborate abstractions at various levels and meta-levels in the course
of history, independent of further genetic evolution. Thus, socio-cultural development of math-
ematics including that of the sophisticated mathematical physics of modern science could pro-
ceed. This is not an unreasonable assumption, but it helps to explain the scope of human
mathematical capabilities only if we realize in the first place that numbers, their applications
and their formal arithmetic processing are themselves highly generalizable inventions. 
In fact, it is the general, unspecialized capabilities that are most characteristic of the human spe-
cies:  language capable of transferring an immense variety of information at different levels of
abstraction; and strategic thinking extending into a far distant future with different scenarios
within which the thinking person itself is represented. New general capabilities often have po-
tential applications that are no longer related to the causes of their origin. This is obvious for
some fundamental technological innovations, for example, in the case of the invention of the
wheel and the discovery of basic features of electromagnetism. Similarly, this extension in
range of applicability may also hold for the biological evolution of general brain capabilities.
For such reasons, the potential of human cognitive faculties may exceed, by far, those that can
readily be explained on the basis of selection pressures up to the stage of hunters and gatherers
when, most likely, the biological features underlying higher brain capabilities were encoded in
the human genome. 
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While thoughts along these lines may help us understand why humans are capable of, say, math-
ematics, they do not explain why conceptualization making use of higher brain capabilities can
lead to a far-reaching understanding of nature as documented by modern science. The consid-
erable (though not unlimited) correspondence of certain (though, of course, not all) mental con-
structs with the order of nature was postulated by the early pre-Socratic Greek philosophers and
has been elaborated to a surprising extent by modern science. Philosophically, this convergence
may lend support to some sort of objective idealism: science is a construction of the human
mind. However, the constructs are not arbitrary. The decision as to whether a construct does or
does not hold is reached by the answers of nature to our questions by means of observation, ex-
periment and systematic thought. The correspondence of some of the mental constructs selected
in this way with the order of nature is not trivial; it is itself an insight supported by the history
of science.  
This interpretation and its variants are consistent with a sensible criterion for selecting a philo-
sophical interpretation from those that seem consistent with facts and logic, namely the contri-
bution to the art of living: objective idealism connects us mentally with the world experienced
around us, and this has been a deeply rooted cultural motive throughout history. Admittedly,
my argument cannot do full justice to the open philosophical questions about the use of the
terms ‘convergence’ and ‘correspondence’ I made by relying on their understanding according
to common sense. The somewhat old-fashioned flavour of objective idealism is, perhaps, not a
valid  argument against it, since most philosophical interpretations have been recycled in the
course of history, including radical scepticism, which can be traced back to Gorgias in the fifth
century B.C. It seems that within the humanities, some of the current intellectual fashions are
rather close to extreme forms of scepticism, such as radical constructivism and historical rela-
tivism, claiming that there is no such thing as scientific truth, that progress in science is an illu-
sion, and that scientific ideas are all artificial constructs depending on transient cultural
situations, and bound to be substituted by others in the course of time. Scientific notions are said
to make sense, if at all,  only 
 
within
 
 specific cultural and historical contexts in which they are
put forward. In my view, it is a good mental excercise to engage in discussions with proponents
of such radical scepticism. It sharpens the mind, but it is rewarding only as long as the said pro-
ponents do not consider themselves intrinsically superior and more enlightened than ‘naive’
practising scientists and normal people. 
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Against radical versions of relativism, I would argue that the historical development of science,
despite all the errors, dead ends and false trails, has left behind an ever-increasing body of per-
sisting knowledge, of real scientific facts. After all,  the earth is not a disk but a sphere, though
only to a first approximation. There are atoms and molecules, stars and galaxies. DNA is genet-
ic material. The diversity of the forms of life evolved. Neural networks process information.
More often than not, a core of scientific insights retains validity even when  conceptual frame-
works are expanded and changed, and theories (such as Newtonian physics) are recognized as
approximations that apply to limited domains. The  progression of knowledge, often denied
nowadays, is only obvious if we look back in history, not by analysing short periods at high res-
olution but by considering the long-term development of science - just as the River Mosel looks
locally (at  high resolution) as if it is going everywhere or nowhere, whereas the large-scale
(low-resolution)  bird’s eye view shows us that it is definitely flowing north-east, downward,
and into the River Rhine. In such contexts, paying attention to too much detail does not lead to
adequate conclusions, but rather tends to obstruct them. 
As already mentioned, claims of truth for scientific insights do not contradict the ambiguity of
the metatheoretical interpretation of the body of available knowledge; rather there is a spectrum
of choices that are consistent with empirical insights and logical thought. In my view, adequate
choices may be facilitated by two basic presuppositions sustained by modern science:  First,
strict physicalism, because the general laws of physics have turned out to be valid for all events
in space and time so far as we can judge. Second, an epistomological scepticism that is support-
ed by science itself, and by decision theory, leading us to recognize that there are limits to hu-
man thoughts and knowledge, as suggested by the uncertainty relations of physics and the
undecidability theorems of mathematics. There are limits to the limits, however; they do not
lend support to 
 
unqualified
 
 scepticism. On the contrary, there is still a very large and important
set of scientific questions that have definite scientific answers. 
If we decide to deny any truth, even approximation to truth in science, we artificially and, I
think unreasonably, exclude some of the most interesting questions the story of science raises
with respect to human self-understanding, namely in what way, to what extent and why there is
such a considerable correspondence between some of the human mental constructs on the one
hand, and the order of nature surrounding us and including us, on the other.
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N
 
 
 
FAVOUR
 
 OF OBJECTIVE IDEALISM: SOME REMARKS ON E=mc2 
Let me illustrate and summarize some of the last points by a well known example: the Einstein
formula. 
“Gentlemen, the ideas about space and time I am going to explain to you are based
on experimental physics. This is their strength. Their tendency is radical. From this
hour onward space as well as time taken by themselves are bound to completely
sink into the shadows and only some sort of union of both should retain autonomy.”
This is Minkowski’s famous introduction to his lecture at the 18th assembly of German scien-
tists and physicians in Cologne on September 21, 1908. A few years earlier, Einstein had pub-
lished the theory of relativity, and Minkowski had given it the mathematical form of perfect
symmetry of physical laws with respect to space and a time coordinate - time multiplied by the
velocity of light and the imaginary square root i of “minus one”.  A byproduct of this formalism,
impressive by the beautiful symmetry of equations, is the formula E = mc2 which had already
been derived earlier by Einstein. The theory of relativity is strongly confirmed by experimental
evidence, in contrast to many other formalisms which are just as beautiful - for example, Ke-
pler’s postulated “harmonic” relationships between distances of planets from the sun based on
mathematical features of ideal Platonic bodies. The theory of relativity is a highly abstract con-
struct of the human mind - just think of beautiful formal symmetry and the use of the imaginary
number  i - and yet it corresponds to real spatio-temporal facts and rules about nature. We would
lose much of the fascination of science as well as our orientation in real life if we tried to deny
remarkable correspondences between such theoretical constructs, on the one hand, and a reality
that exists without us, on the other, by claiming that all of it is just arbitrary mental construction
and nothing else, not only the formalism, but also the alleged correspondence with reality. It
seems, at least to me, that the notion implicitly underlying the thinking of most practising sci-
entists is still the philosophically most adequate interpretation: physics is considered a construct
of the human mind and an approach to partial but true insights about nature and its order. And
this then leaves us, but also allows us, to discuss challenging though not undisputed interpreta-
tions at the metatheoretical level, such as Schelling’s philosophical notions proposed around
1800, on the hidden unity of the ideal and the real aspects of the universe; and Minkowski’s
concepts, of 1908, on the hidden unity of space and time. 
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NOTES: 
I am greatly indebted to Prof. Hans-Jörg Rheinberger and Dr. Dieter Hoffmann for the critical
reading of my manuscript, and to Prof. Jürgen Renn, Dr. Baichun Zhang and Dr. Matthias
Schemmel for helpful discussions. With respect to cognition and mathematics, I benefited from
Peter Damerow’s article in No. 117 of this preprint series on “The material culture of calcula-
tion”.  
It would have been very difficult to include adequate references for the different broad aspects
combined in this essay. Some aspects are covered in the reference section of my book on “Sci-
ence and the image of man” on which my article is partially based (“Im Spiegel der Natur erken-
nen wir uns selbst - Wissenschaft und Menschenbild”, Rowohlt Reinbek 1998, pp. 289-312). 
The story of gun powder in China mentioned on the first page of this article is treated in much
detail in Joseph Needham’s “Science and Civilization in China”, Vol. V,7, Cambridge Univer-
sity Press 1986. Thang alchemists searched for elixiers of life and material immortality. Their
jars must have contained, among other substances, those required for gun powder. In their trea-
tises dated by historians as early as the 9th century, there were warnings not to mix salpeter,
sulfur and honey, because, with such mixtures, “hands and faces were burnt, and eventually the
whole house burnt down”.
With regard to the history of science and technology of electricity in Europe, and its virtual ab-
sence in China, see A. Kloss “Von der Electricität zur Elektrizität”, Birkhäuser Basel Boston
Stuttgart 1987. In this book the author mentions, on p. 41, Richmann’s contacts with Jesuits in
Peking on electricity in the middle of the 18th century. The relation to the Academy of St. Pe-
tersburg is documented by P.A. Gaubil, “Correspondence de Peking 1722-1759” (pp. 617, 810,
811), Libraire Droz, Genève (1970). In a letter to Kratzenstein and Richmann of April 30, 1755
(not yet knowing that Richmann died by lightning while doing experiments on atmospheric
electricity in 1753), Gaubil wrote: “... in current circumstances it is not appropriate to demon-
strate experiments on electricity in front of Chinese intellectuals and dignitaries; this matter is
not without danger and disadvantages for us. Before that, the Chinese ought to learn about the
facts and causes in this matter, and this is not easy. Pater Josephus Amiot, fellow of the local
On Modern Science, Human Cognition and Cultural Diversity
15
French College, thought and performed ingeniously in his way of doing experiments. Now he
does something else...”. 
The reasons for the “blockades” of Chinese technology in modern times are a matter of contro-
versies (see B. Gille’s book on “The history of techniques”, Vol. 1, “Techniques and Civiliza-
tions”, Blocked technical systems - Chinese Techniques, pp. 38-407, especially p. 406/407,
Gordon and Beed Scientific pulishers, New York 1986). While Needham emphasizes that the
West benefited from a capitalist, manufacturing and mercantile economy, other authors insist
that almost every element regarded by historians as a mayor contribution to the industrial rev-
olution in North Western Europe was also present in China. Only the Galilean-Newtonian sci-
ence was missing. 
Basic science motivated by philosophical questions about nature is crucially involved in the de-
velopment not only of electricity, but also of other fields of technology, such as organic chem-
istry and genetic engineering. In the 19th century, the development of organic chemistry was
stimulated by increasing evidence of how molecules were made up of atoms and of the role of
multivalent chemical bonds between atoms, including carbon and nitrogen atoms. The notion
that organic chemical substances and reactions have a key role in the understanding of basic life
processes which may, in principle, be reproduced and analysed in the test tube has been gaining
weight ever since. The synthesis of urea by Wöhler (1828) was hailed as a breakthrough. There-
after, many biological substances were synthesized by chemical reactions. At the beginning of
the 20th century, atomic physics revealed that electric forces were the main determinants of at-
oms and their properties. To advance understanding of them, quantum mechanics was devel-
oped introducing new concepts into the fundamental laws of physics, but the basic forces
responsible for atomic and molecular structures, even in the framework of the new quantum
mechanics, were and still are attraction and repulsion between charged particles, nuclei and
electrons, according to Coulomb’s law. Quantum physics led to the understanding not only of
atoms, but also of chemical bonds linking atoms into molecules, including organic molecules,
which play essential parts in biological processes of reproduction and evolution. 
Modern genetic engineering is based on the insights into the structure and function of the heri-
ditary substance DNA. The construction of the DNA model, the double helix, required detailed
knowledge of dimensions and angles of chemical bonds, which could only be understood in
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terms of quantum physics. The model was confirmed by the use of X-ray diffraction. It led to a
fundamental understanding of the molecular basis of biological reproduction, heredity and evo-
lution, and all this occurred to a large extent  between 1952 and 1963. 
Again, it took a while before practical applications were envisaged. These came about only after
further research into more specific problems: How does the DNA helix unwind during replica-
tion, how do the mechanisms ascertain that chains made up of hundreds of millions nucleotides
can be copied reliably with very few errors, if any, and how is chromosomal DNA broken and
recombined? The enzymes involved in cutting, re-uniting, transcription, copying and repairing
nucleic acid molecules then provided essential tools for artificial construction of DNA sequenc-
es, and this was one of the main origins of modern genetic engineering.
Alfred Gierer, February 25, 2000
